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Bernard E. Rollin, Animal Rights and Human Morality 
(Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1981) 
Professor Rollin is well known to 
most readers of this journal, at least 
by name and· reputation. He has log-
ged more miles and spoken· to more 
people on behalf of animals than any 
other philosopher I can thin k of, save 
Peter Singer. Now Rollin has brought 
out a book. I think it is a very good 
book, one that should be read by 
anyone who is in any way concerned 
with animals. Unfortunately, I fear 
that many who should learn from this 
book will not. 
Animal Rights and Human Morality 
is divided into four parts. Part one 
j s "Mo r a I T heoryandAn ima Is. " It is 
a 65-page sketch of a moral theory 
and its application· to animals. 
Although the theory is interesting and 
suggestive, philosophers will complain 
that it is not presented in enough 
detail. Non -ph ilosophers will probably 
think that it is boring and nit-pick-
ing. Part Two is "Animal Rights and 
Legal Rights." Here Rollin reasons 
from premises supplied . by Ronald 
Dworkin to the conclusion that if the 
moral claims of Part One are true, 
animals should be granted legal 
rights. Philosophers will be bothered 
by Rollin's apparently uncritical 
acceptance of Dworkin's views on the 
relation between morality and law. 
Non-philosophers are apt to think that 
the claim this section is meant to 
establish is obvious. Part Three is 
"The Use and Abuse of Animals in 
Research." This is the best part of a 
very good book. Not on Iy is the main 
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theme of the ethics of animal experi-
mentation treated in an interesting 
and competent way, but there are also 
stimulati ng asides on science educa-
tion, the role of humanists in science, 
science policYi and general issues in 
philosophy of science. 
At least one scientist has al ready 
responded hysterically to Rollin's cri-
. tique, and at least one animal rights 
advocate has accused Rollin of lacking 
moral purity, as we shall see below. 
Part Four is "Morality and Pet Ani-
mals. " To the best of my knowledge, 
this is the first time a philosopher has 
treated this subject at any length. 
Li ke puppies and kittens, this section 
should win 
everyone. 
the affection of almost 
So what 
very good 
is the problem? 
book that many 
Here is a 
people who 
should know better will ignore or dis-
like. Why? 
Rollin does not conform to the 
standa rd stereotypes. Neither do his 
views. He is neither a "sadistic vivi-
sectionist" nor a "bleeding heart 
humaniac." He is an "analytic" phi-
losopher who became interested in the 
moral status of animals while 
researching an earlier book on philos-
ophy of language. He has also pub-
lished ·extensively on the eighteenth-
centu ry German ph ilosopher, Immanuel 
Kant, and Kant's influence on Rollin's 
views in moral philosophy is quite 
clear. But in addition to his back-
ground in analytic philosophy, Rollin 
is also a Professor of Physiology and 
Biophysics. He regularly teaches 
veterinary medical ethics in a College 
of Veterinary Medicine, and he co-
teaches a year-long honors course in 
basic biology. In short, he seems 
neither fish nor fowl. He is, per-
haps, too sympathetic to science for 
those in the humane movement, and 
too sympathetic to animals for those in 
the sciences; and too sympathetic to 
both science and. animals for many 
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philosophers. 
That this is so can be seen by 
examining two recent reviews of Ani-
mal Rights and Human Morality. The 
first appeared in the New England 
Journal of Medicine for May 27, 1982. 
It was written by Mau rice B. Visscher 
(M.D., Ph.D.) of. the University of 
Minnesota. Visscher writes: 
Rollin has attempted to demo-
lish all the ethical bases that 
have been used to justify the 
humane use of lower animals. 
Ethics and morals are notorious 
for thei r dependence on some 
agreed-on basic assumptions. 
Rollin states his own position 
on morals in a very dogmatic 
fashion. (p. 1303) 
Visscher seems to misu nderstand the 
nature of ethics and moral philosophy. 
First, ethics is not "notorious" for its 
dependence on shared basic assump-
tions. The mai nstreams of both the 
Kantian and Utilitarian traditions hold 
that what is right and good is utterly 
independent of what people think is 
right and good, or what people's 
"agreed on basic assumption (s)" may 
be. Contraetarians would disagree, 
but that is not surprising. Questions 
about the fou ndations of eth ics and 
morality are philosophical questions, 
resolvable only by philosophical dia-
logue and rational discourse. This 
leads us to a second interesting claim 
in the quoted passage: that Rollin 
states his own position in a dogmatic 
fashion. In truth, like most philoso-
phers, Rollin gives arguments and 
adduces considerations for· his views. 
One may challenge the cogency of 
Rollin's arguments, but it would be 
fatuous· or worse to deny their exis-
tence. Perhaps Visscher thinks that 
the assertion of any moral views, 
especially unconventional ones, is 
"dogmatic." God forbid he should 
stumble into a class on moral philoso-
phy. Not only would he see "dogma-
tism," but competing "dogmatisms" in 
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conflict. 
Visscher goes on to say: 
The author is somewhat less 
candid about the sponsorship 
under which he writes. Only 
by careful reading of the 
introduction does it become 
evident that this work was 
subsidized by the Humane 
Society of the United States. 
This organization is familiar to 
scientists as a vigorous oppo-
nent of animal experimentation 
(p. 1303) 
Here there are several falsehoods 
strung together in the service of a 
bad argument. 
The humane society IS evi I. 
Rollin's work was "subsidized" 
by the Humane Society. 
Therefore, Rollin's work is 
evil. 
Arguments of this form have again 
become fashionable. Here is another 
example: 
Communists are evil. 
The nuclear freeze campaign is 
supported by communists. 
Therefore, the nuclear freeze 
campaign is evil. 
But the logic of the a rgument aside, 
Visscher simply has his facts wrong. 
Rollin is very straightforward about 
his association with the Humane Soci-
ety. He writes: 
I am especially grateful to John 
Hoyt, president of the Humane 
Society of the United States, 
for his commitment to this 
book, and for his willingness 
to provide the support of the 
Humane Society of the United 
States to ensure its publica-
tion. (p. xii) 
It is not clear from this passage what 
financial relationship, if any, exists 
between Rollin and HSUS. (Perhaps 
Visscher knows something we don't.) 
I would be willing to bet, however, 
that while Rollin's research is "subsi-
dized," Visscher's is "supported." 
(See Rollin's chapter on "The Debase-
ment of Language in. Science. It) 
Moreover, it comes as a surprise to 
me to lea rn that HSUS is a "vigorous 
opponent of animal experimentation." 
I thought they were a mi Id supporter 
of some restrictions on some research 
involving animals. Perhaps that is 
enough in Visscher's circles to be 
counted as a "vigorous opponent of 
animal experimentation." 
Visscher quotes Rollin· as making 
the familiar point, reminiscent of 
Plato, that if power confers moral 
legitimacy, then it would follow that 
the monstrous actions of the Nazis 
wou Id have been morally legitimate. 
This, of course, is an argument 
against the thesis that power confers 
moral legitimacy. Visscher writes: 
Although Rollin does not exon-
erate the Nazis, in effect he 
does so by comparing the kill-
ing of lower animals for science 
with the atrocities of the Holo-
ca ust. ( p . 1303 ) 
In ten years of reading freshman 
essays, I have never seen 
egregious misunderstanding 
reductio argument. 
a m
of 
ore 
a 
Towards the end 
Visscher tries to put 
perspective. 
of his 
Rollin's 
review, 
book in 
It is probably no accident that 
very few persons with exten-
sive scientific education are 
activists in the animal humane 
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movement . . . Few physicians 
will care to read this book . . 
but its appearance at this 
time is evidence that the anti-
science group in America is 
becoming more vociferous . . . 
(pp. 1303-4) 
After quoting an Associated Press 
report of an Animal Liberation Front 
action which liberated· a number of 
laboratory animals in England, he 
informs us (again to my surprise) of 
"a comparable raid involving the 
National Institutes of Health."(p. 
1304) What does this have to do with 
the book under review? 
"Rollin's writings will give a 
false cloak of morality to such 
behavior." (p. 1304) 
Visscher concludes with somber and 
foreboding words: 
Like creation science, animal 
Iiberation based on speciesism 
is likely to be with us for a 
long time The rational seg-0 
ment of society must work dili-
gently to counter their perni-
cious influences on biologic 
science. (p. 1304) 
What are we to make of this? It is 
not easy to respond in an open and 
honest way to searching criticism, 
whatever one does for a living 0 Even 
so, there are many scientists who 
would find Visscher's review as misin-
formed and ill-argued, not to mention 
arrogant, as ,. There is an awaken-
ing in the scientific community, 
bringing with it a new sense of moral 
and social responsibility, and we 
would do well to remember that. 
Still, there are a great many scien-
tists who share Visscher's outlook. 
Many of them are intelligent people 
who are otherwise morally sensitive. 
What accounts for the complete col-
lapse of intellectual rigor when it 
comes to self-examination? 
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Interestingly enough, Rollin's book 
provides pa rt of the answer. To 
greatly oversimplify his discussion on 
pages 107 and following, scientists are 
not trained to be Newtons and Ein-
steins, relentless questioners with a 
sense of wonder about the workings of 
natu re Instead science education0 
emphasizes technique, manipulation of 
data, and manual dexterity at the 
expense of theoretical soph istication 
and originality. As Rollin writes: 
[The u nderg raduate] tests . . 
are typically short answer, 
true or false, or multiple 
choice, geared to the regurgi-
tation of discrete· bits of infor-
mation. (po 108) 
. . . the graduate student is 
essentially handed a problem 
for research by the advisor 
and even handed the ground 
rules for possible solutions. 
This is his apprenticeship - if 
he succeeds, or makes head-
way, he is certified as a mem-
ber of the field and is entitled 
to pursue these puzzles, seek 
funding, and replicate himself 
through his graduate students. 
(p. 109) 
This process leads to conformity not 
only in theory and practice, but in 
dress, mode of speech, professional 
etiquette, carriage and deportment. 
In such a context concern for animals, 
and moral reflection generally, is all 
too often seen as sentimentality, 
squeamishness, and lack of profes-
sionalism. 
But scientists are not alone in fail-
ing to understand and appreciate Rol-
lin's book. Mort Frankel, writing in 
Agenda for May/june 1982, charges 
Rollin with "the exaltation of· science 
over all else." (p. 29) This hardly 
sounds like the same man whom 
Visscher lumps with the creationists 
as part of a rising tide of anti-science 
hysteria. 
17 E&A IV/l 
According to Frankel, Rollin has 
written two books. In the first "he 
ably restates valuable truths that 
have already been published many 
times with in the last decade." (p. 30) 
In the second, Rollin takes it all 
back. 
In support of his new position, 
which adds up to experimenta-
tion-with-kindness and vivisec-
tion-when-necessary, he pleads 
the importance of "habits and 
traditions entrenched by time 
and nurtured by expediency." 
(p. 28) 
Professor Ro
stance is that 
team player 
llin's 
of a 
who, 
general 
dedicated 
however 
much wedded to justice, ki nd-
ness, integrity and all laudable 
things, is guided by one para-
mount principle: "Don't rock 
the boat." If the benefits of 
"science as we know it" con-
flict with what we believe is 
right, then too bad about what 
we believe is right. (p. 29) 
There are two kinds of responses 
one could make to Frankel. One 
would consist in a philosophical dis-
cou rse on the relation of theory to 
practice. It might note along the way 
that the moral . theory wh ich Roll i n 
sketches in Part One is not absolutist. 
Rollin is a Kantian, but he is also 
sensible. Although I think that ulti-
mately such a position (sensible Kan-
tianism) is untenable, never mind for 
now. The point is that Rollin is no 
abolitionist in Part One or anywhere 
else. 
But discussing the issue in this 
way is really to miss the point. Rol-
lin's book comes from a particular 
institutional and theoretical locus. He 
is involved in the day-to-day business 
of science education. He works in an 
environment in which the well-en-
trenched tendency is to view animals 
as disposable laboratory equipment. 
Rollin is aware of the problems and 
thought-patterns of working scien-
tists. As a result he is unwilling to 
accept the easy shibboleth .promul-
gated by so ma ny unknowledgeable 
people in the animal liberation move-
ment that alternatives to animals are 
there waiting, if only nasty scientists 
would avail themselves of them. But 
although Rollin sees science from the 
inside, he has done more than his 
share of boat-rocking (contrary to 
Frankel's remark, in its own way as 
arrogant as anything of Visscher's). 
Unlike Rollin, most animal libera-
tionists live and work in institutions 
far removed from the pain and suffer-
ing of which they write and speak. 
All too often we in the movement are 
too willing to benefit from the exploi-
tation of animals while condemning 
those who. do the exploiting. And 
when we are consistent enough not to 
do that, we engage in interminable 
debates about moral pu rity that give 
fundamentalist theology a good name 
by compa rison. And, as Rollin 
reminds us, the question that should 
always loom before us is this: Are 
the animals better off in virtue of our 
efforts? And all too often the answer 
is No. 
Rollin's book is important because 
it speaks to all sides of these issues 
from positions which they desperately 
need to better appreciate. To scien-
tists he offers the perspective of 
someone in sympathy with thei r aims 
and goals, who has a moral conscious-
ness as well, one that is rigorous and 
well-argued, not syrupy and senti-
mental. To animal liberationists, he 
offers the perspective of someone on 
the side of the angels who under-
stands the practical difficulties 
involved in putting our principles into 
action. It would be a pity if a book 
explicitly intended to help the animals 
by p romoti ng dialogue between the 
humans should fail because of the 
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blindness and prejudice of both sides. 
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